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COPING WITH MINES 
A Critical Risk For Repatriating Kurds 
The risk to civilians from mines and 
unexploded munitions is a problem 
common to most areas subject to 
prolonged warfare and insurgencies. 
Afghanistan has been attempting to deal 
with the problem for some time, while 
countries like Angola, Cambodia, 
Ethiopia and Mozambique will certainly 
need to address the issue in the near 
future. So must Iraq. Not only are the 
immediate border areas with Iran, Syria 
and Turkey heavily mined, but mines 
have been sown throughout much of 
Iraqi Kurdistan over the past two 
decades. Many of these mines are in 
areas currently being repopulated and 
the death toll and maiming of civilians 
caused by mines and other unexploded 
ordinance is a critical problem 
throughout much of the region. While 
some limited mine clearance was 
undertaken by the US. military in the 
immediate vicinity of Dohukand Zakho, 
mine-clearance activities by the allies 
was suspended with their withdrawal 
from Iraq in late summer of 1991 and 
there are no other agencies currently 
addressing the issue. 
There are basically three groups of 
areas where mines are widespread. The 
first is along the border and especially in 
those regions along the Iran-Iraq border 
where extensive fighting took place 
during the eight year war and where 
territorial advantage shifted frequently. 
Both sides laid extensive mine fields, 
often well into Iraqi territory. It is 
doubtful whether the Iranians made 
maps of the fields they sowed, or, if they 
did, whether such maps would ever be 
released to a prospective mine-clearing 
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agency. Likewise, the Iraqi military 
maintains that while maps were made, 
these were kept locally and were 
destroyed during the recent Kurdish 
uprising (the same position is 
maintained by Iraqi government 
authorities with regard to the other two 
groups of minefields described below). 
Areas falling into this category include 
the region around Choman and the 
upper reaches of the Hamilton Road 
leading to the Haj Omerborder point, the 
areas around Panjwin and especially 
throughout the pedicle that extends into 
Iran and the areas from Halabsha to the 
border. 
Second, are areas surrounding 
military installations, especially in 
remote regions and including the many 
strategic mountain-top observation 
positions. The density of Iraqi military 
installations is one of the features of Iraqi 
Kurdistan that astounds most first-time 
visitors; there can be few areas in the 
world so heavily militarized as this 
region. These mines were laid for 
defensive reasons and the locations of 
such fields are usually known to local 
people. No clearing, however, has been 
begun in any of these areas. Since many 
are on steep mountain sides, there is the 
attendant risk of mines being washed 
down the mountain sides by either 
snow-melt or soil-creep. 
A third group of mine fields are the 
most problematic; these may be referred 
to as opportunistic mine-fields. They were 
sown specifically to terrorize the 
Kurdish population. Their locations 
vary,but are widespread throughout the 
former so-called free-fire zones where all 
civilian movements were prohibited. 
Sites of such mines include the verges 
along roads, in orchards and in 
vineyards, around springs and wells and 
along mule tracks. The purpose of such 
mines was to discourage people from 
inhabiting the regions or attempting to 
return to their original villages. The 
extent of such minefields remains a 
matter of conjecture; their incidence is 
perhaps somewhat less than that 
proposed by Kurdish militants but 
nevertheless, the frequent accidents they 
produce suggests that they are anything 
but uncommon and must, therefore, be 
dealt with if people are to safely return to 
their villages and farms. 
Aside from the widespread 
distribution of mines, the problem is 
further complicated by the deployment 
of a great diversity of mines. One reliable 
source suggested that at least fourteen 
different types of mines have been 
deployed. They fall into two basic 
groups, namely, anti-personnel mines 
which deliver only an explosion and 
more often maim than kill and shrapnel- 
loaded mines which are much more 
deadly. The latter are often wired 
together to explode in clusters. While not 
the most deadly, the small plastic coated 
mines (mostly of Italian origin) are of 
special concern because they are 
impossible to detect with standard mine- 
clearing devices and their small size 
makes them difficult to spot. Moreover, 
some mines are set to detonate only at 
pressures exerted by humans; thus sheep 
and goats grazing an area without 
incident does not necessarily mean that 
mines are absent. The longevity of most 
mines, especially the plastic type, is more 
or less indefinite and thus this is not a 
problem that will diminish in severity 
over time. 
The incidence of mine deaths and 
injuries is very high, particularly in areas 
falling into the first group above. For 
example, it was suggested by one 
otherwise reliable informant that in the 
fifteen-kilometer stretch along Hamilton 
Road between Choman and the Iranian 
border, at least 500 mine-related deaths 
had occurred in April and May this year 
and a much larger number had been 
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maimed. Such a figuremaybe somewhat 
inflated; doctors with a small German 
NGO in Choman were unable to confirm 
the statistic. However, they were able to 
confirm that in the month following their 
arrival in Choman, there had been 
between three to five mine injuries per 
day, of which about half were fatal. At 
the time of my visit to their hospital there 
were five cases in their surgical ward, all 
of which had required amputations and 
three of which were children. Some fifty 
mine amputees were known to be 
residing in Choman in late June. 
At the hospital at Diyana (Saddam 
Hospital), to which most cases in the 
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region were referred, mine injuries were 
the major cause of surgical procedures. 
About a dozen cases, again half of which 
were children, were resident at the 
hospital at the time of my visit. While no 
specific statistics on mine injuries had 
been kept by the hospital, the senior 
surgeon suggested that there had been 
between 800 to 1,000 mine and ordinance 
injuries in the Diyana basin during May 
and June, of which about twenty percent 
had been fatal. Records of mine injuries 
were kept at the Panjwin hospital - 
another high risk area - where, during 
the period 1 April to 6 June 1991, a total 
of 262 ordinance-related injuries and 160 
mine-related injuries had occurred, of 
which seventy were fatal. 
Persons most at risk from mines and 
other unexploded ordinance are those 
collecting firewood - which, as 
spontaneous settlements grow, means 
that people must venture further into the 
hills to find supplies; persons getting 
clean water from mountain springs; 
people scavenging for building materials 
or other items of value among 
abandoned Iraqi army outposts; and 
shepherds. It is clear that children 
perform many of these tasks and are, 
therefore, especially at risk from mines. 
Aside from human casualties, there is 
also a high loss of livestock; shepherds 
will only walk behind their herds 
because of a fear of mines. 
If, therefore, there is to be any 
extensive resettlement and a resumption 
of traditional agricultural pursuits by 
Kurds in the valleys from which they 
have been systematically displaced over 
the past decade, then there is an urgent 
need to develop both a mine-awareness 
campaign and a comprehensive mine- 
clearance operation. Whether the latter 
can or will ever be undertaken by the 
Iraqi military within the framework of a 
negotiated autonomy agreement 
between the government and the 
Kurdish Front clearly remains a matter 
of conjecture. Even if the will were there 
at some time in the future, there is some 
question about whether the Iraqi 
military has the necessary skills or 
capacity to mount an extensive 
campaign. High-level U.S. military 
respondents suggested that the Iraqi 
military's experience is limited to mine- 
sowing and it would be ineffective in any 
clearing operation. As for the Peshrnerga 
(Kurdish Front guerrillas), their skills 
and experience with mine clearing is 
essentially limited to a few deserters 
from the Iraqi army. 
The risks to returning Kurds from 
mines and other unexploded ordinance 
will, therefore, remain high throughout 
much of the region for many years unless 
a concerted effort is made to generate 
more awareness of the hazard and, in 
areas close to current habitation, to 
undertake a systematic mine-clearance 
program. Consequently, it is incumbent 
upon the UN system to initiate, as soon 
as possible and in conjunction with other 
appropriate agencies, a major mine- 
awareness and mine-clearance program 
throughout Iraqi Kurdistan. Such a 
program should possibly be modelled 
on the program recently implemented in 
Afghanistan and the one designed and 
ready for implementation in Cambodia. 
Indeed, a Kurdish program has the 
advantage of drawing on the 
experiences garnered in Afghanistan. 
Moreover, while there appears tobe little 
expertise or equipment in Iraqi 
Kurdistan to undertake a major mine- 
clearance program and hence technical 
assistance for such a task will need to be 
provided by outside agencies, the 
capacity in terms of human resources to 
provide a comprehensive mine- 
awareness program in high-risk areas 
can readily be put in place by the Kurdish 
Front, providing some basic training and 
the appropriate literature is made 
available. Moreover, with adequate 
technical assistance, small village-based 
mine-clearance teams could also be 
trained and equipped. ai 
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